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THOMPSON V UNITED STATES: LIMITING
THE SCOPE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
In 1982 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Thompson v.
United States,' ruled that illegally seized evidence is admissible in a pro-
bation revocation hearing absent egregious circumstances.
2
The fourth amendment states that the "right of the people to be secure
...in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . In 1914 the Supreme
Court, in Weeks v. United States,4 espoused the "exclusionary rule," which
bars all tangible evidence obtained in an illegal search from introduction
at trial.5 The primary justification for the exclusionary rule is the effica-
cious deterrence of police misconduct.6
While the exclusionary rule precludes the use of illegally seized evidence
to establish a defendant's guilt or innocence at trial, the Supreme Court
has admitted such evidence for other purposes and at other proceedings.
For example, under appropriate circumstances, illegally seized evidence is
admissible at trial to impeach a defendant's testimony.7
i. 444 A.2d 972 (D.C. Apr. 21, 1982).
2. Id at 973.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. Id at 392. Although Weeks applied only in the federal courts, the exclusionary rule
was extended to state courts through the operation of the fourteenth amendment and the
Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. A significant number of judges and scholars, however, have
questioned whether the exclusionary rule actually serves to deter police misconduct. See,
e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing). See generally Spiotto, Search and Seizure. An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and 1is Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973) (a study of motions to suppress in lower
criminal courts in Chicago which concluded that the exclusionary rule did not deter law
enforcement officers from conducting illegal searches and seizures); Oaks, Studying the Ex-
clusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CMI. L. REV. 665 (1970) (concluding that the
exclusionary rule is of little deterrent value, if any).
7. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954). Similarly, the Court has permitted prosecutors to use certain evidence to impeach a
defendant's testimony by use of incriminating statements obtained in violation of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)
(illegally seized evidence admissible in grand jury proceeding); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976) (illegally seized evidence admissible so
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In Harris v. New York,8 a divided Supreme Court9 ruled that evidence
excluded under the standards set forth in Weeks" may be referred to dur-
ing cross-examination and in a closing argument to impeach the credibility
of the defendant so long as the "trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies
legal standards."" Furthermore, the Court has held the exclusionary rule
inapplicable in grand jury proceedings. 2 Under both circumstances the
Court concluded that police misconduct would be sufficiently deterred by
exclusion of the tainted evidence from the government's case-in-chief at
trial. 13
The Court further clarified its position in Oregon v. Hass 4 by observing
that the evidence is a "valuable aid to the jury in assessing the [defend-
ant's] credibility."' 5 In United States v. Calandra,'6 the Court emphasized
that the "exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use
of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons ....
Application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."' 7 The Calandra
Court concluded that, because of the nature and purpose of a grand jury
proceeding, applying the exclusionary rule would be of little deterrent
value;" the law enforcement officers did not obtain the evidence primarily
to secure an indictment. In addition, a grand jury proceeding is not a
criminal proceeding and best serves its purpose if provided with the great-
long as evidence is trustworthy); but see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (statement
obtained under circumstances rendering it unreliable may not be used for impeachment).
8. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
9. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Harlan, Stewart, and White made up
the majority; Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented.
10. 232 U.S. 643 (1961).
1I. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. Cf Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (circumstances
surrounding statement rendered it unreliable).
12. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Interestingly, a statutory exclusion-
ary rule protects a grand jury witness from being asked questions based on illegal electronic
surveillance. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976). See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); see
generally C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING, §§ 223-236 (1978 & Supp.
1982).
13. The government's case-in-chief is the portion of the trial at which the prosecutor
attempts to carry his initial burden of proof by presenting his evidence. See Blacks Law
Dictionary 196 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). This is usually the point at which evidence of a search is
introduced to prove the defendant's guilt. The same evidence is often useful for other pur-
poses, such as impeachment or cross-examination. See generally Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971).
14. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
15. Id. at 721.
16. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
17. Id. at 348.
18. Id. at 351.
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est possible amount of information.' 9
The Supreme Court continued to broaden the exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule in United States v. Janis2 ° by refusing to extend the rule to
civil proceedings.2 The Court maintained that in civil proceedings only
incidental deterrence might be realized by precluding a different sovereign
from using the evidence in a separate proceeding.22
A clear pattern has emerged indicating that the Supreme Court is in-
creasingly reluctant to apply the exclusionary rule where the deterrent
value is uncertain or minimal.23 Although the Supreme Court has yet to
rule on the application of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation
hearings, the Court addressed the role of probation revocation hearings in
the criminal justice system in Mempa v. Rhay.24 The Mempa Court noted
that when a probation revocation hearing is combined with an initial sen-
tencing proceeding it is considered a "stage of a criminal proceeding. 25
The Court nonetheless determined that despite the potential loss of liberty
at stake, the probation revocation hearing is not so critical that it requires a
right to an attorney."
The Supreme Court distinguished a probation revocation hearing from
a criminal trial in Gagnon v. Scarpeli.27 The Gagnon Court clarified its
position on probation revocation hearings, 28 noting that "probation revo-
cation. . . is not a stage of a criminal prosecution." 29 The Court observed
that the difference between a criminal trial and a revocation proceeding is
the informal nature of a probation revocation hearing, where formal pro-
19. Id at 354.
20 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
21. Id. at 459-60. Law enforcement officers turned over the fruits of an illegal search to
the Internal Revenue Service, which in turn prosecuted Janis in a civil proceeding.
22, Id. at 457-58.
23. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Defendant sought habeus corpus
relief claiming that his fourth amendment rights had been violated. The Court held that the
defendant had been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim in the state
courts. Id. at 481-82.
24. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
25. Id at 137.
26. Id
27. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
28. Mempa held that a probation revocation hearing was a stage in a criminal proceed-
ing because, on occasion, the hearing includes an initial sentencing hearing. Sentencing is
an integral part of the criminal trial process, and initial sentencing coupled with any other
proceeding would correctly be viewed as a stage in a criminal proceeding. Mempa, 389 U.S.
at 134. Mempa did not, however, pass on the quality of probation revocation hearings.
29. Gagnon, 411 U.S. 782. Gagnon was denied a probation revocation hearing by the
lower court. The Supreme Court, however, held that due process mandates a probationer's
right to a hearing. Id. at 791.
19831
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cedures and rules of evidence are not employed.3" In Greenholtz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates,3 the Supreme Court emphasized the distinction
between a parole release and a parole or probation revocation. The "revo-
cationers," the Court explained, are "at liberty" and have a greater tangi-
ble interest at stake.32
In light of the Supreme Court decisions, many lower courts have deter-
mined that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in probation revocation
hearings.33 A majority of the United States courts of appeals have en-
dorsed the Ninth Circuit's analysis of this issue in its United States v. Win-
sett decision.34 Winsett violated the terms of his probation by leaving the
district without notifying his probation officer. He was subsequently ar-
rested by the United States Border Patrol for possessing a large quantity of
30. Id at 789.
31. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
32. Id at 9.
33. See United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019,
1020-22 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); United
States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 818-19 (7th Cir. 1971); Grogan v. United States, 262 F.2d 78, 79
(5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 944 (1959); but cf. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d
1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'd after remand, 617 F.2d 48, 51 (1980); Grubbs v. State, 373
So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979) (exclusionary rule held applicable to probation cases solely because
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides that "Articles or information obtained in violation of this
right, analogous to fourth amendment of federal constitution, shall not be admissible in
evidence."). In State v. Dodd, 396 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the court held that
but-for the Florida Supreme Court's interpretaton of that clause in Grubbs, "we would hold
the exclusionary rule inapplicable to probation cases." 396 So. 2d at 1208. See also Adams
v. State, 153 Ga. App. 41, 264 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). The court in Adams
relied on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), which stated: "The exclu-
sionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either
during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. It follows. . . that the Fourth Amend-
ment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well .... " See State v.
McMilliam, 243 N.C. 775, 92 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1956) (court cited no authority or precedent in
support of the exclusionary rule); Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973)
(court interpreted Wong Sun to mean that no evidence obtained during an unconstitutional
search was ever admissable. The court relied on a self-constructed syllogism that no revoca-
tion can occur without competent evidence; illegally seized evidence is incompetent; there-
fore illegally seized evidence can not be used to revoke probation); Rushing v. State, 500
S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (arresting officer had prior knowledge that defendant
was on probation and used that knowledge to arrest him).
34. 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975). See, e.g., United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); but see United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (1978),
afl'd after remand, 617 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1980); see also supra note 33.
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marijuana.35 Prior to his trial on charges of possession with intent to sell
marijuana, Winsett successfully moved to suppress the marijuana because
the search had violated the fourth amendment. The unlawful possession-
with-intent-to-sell marijuana charge was dismissed.36 However, at the
probation revocation hearing, the testimony of a border patrolman was
introduced to establish that Winsett had violated his probation by leaving
his judicial district.3 7
The Winsett court analyzed the purpose of probation and the value of
information at revocation hearings, stating that the conditions of probation
serve a dual purpose in that they enhance the chance for rehabilitation
while simulaneously affording society a measure of protection. Because
violation of probation conditions may indicate that the probationer is not
ready or is incapable of rehabilitation by integration into society, it is ex-
tremely important that all reliable evidence shedding light on probationer's
conduct be available during probation revocation proceedings.38
The court concluded that both interests were best served by allowing the
border patrolman to testify at the probation revocation hearing. The Win-
sett court reasoned that effective deterrence could only be achieved if the
border patrol had been aware that the appellant was on probation.39
Favoring the interests of societal protection, the court stated that the exclu-
sionary rule is inapplicable in probation hearings because the rule "tend[s]
to frustrate the remedial purposes of the probation system.'"40
The Fourth Circuit stands alone in its disagreement with the Winseti
analysis. In United States v. Workman,4 a probation officer conducted a
warrantless search on Workman's property.4 2 The court premised its dis-
cussion by asserting that a probation revocation hearing is an adjudicative
criminal proceeding. 43 In support of this proposition, the Workman court
35. Winsett, 518 F.2d at 52. The violation of probation was not the possession of illegal
drugs, but leaving the area without reporting to a probation officer.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 54-55 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 55.
40. id.
41. 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978).
42. This case is distinguishable on the facts. In Workman, the searching officer was
aware of defendant's probationary status. Id. at 1206. Thus, effective deterrence might be
achieved by applying the exclusionary rule. The Workman court nonetheless failed to dis-
pose of the case on this distinction and instead, ignored the distinction in favor of disagree-
ing with the other circuit courts.
43. The Workman court, however, recognized the noncriminal nature of a probation
revocation hearing by referring to probation officers' investigations as "'administrative"
searches. Id. at 1207.
19831
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noted that Congress included probation revocation hearings in the Crimi-
nal Code; therefore, the hearings were intended to be criminal in nature."
Second, the court noted that a probation revocation hearing may result in
the imposition of criminal sanctions.". The Workman court concluded
that because the exclusionary rule must be applied in all criminal proceed-
ings, it should apply in the probation revocation hearing as well. 46
In Thompson v. United States,47 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals extended earlier judicial analysis, ruling that "absent egregious cir-
cumstances," the exclusionary rule is not applicable to probation
revocation hearings.4 ' As a result of a plea bargaining agreement, Thomp-
son was placed on probation for two years. Thompson was subsequently
arrested, searched, and a weapon was found on his person.49 Although the
weapons charge was dismissed after the trial court held the arrest and
search unlawful, a probation revocation hearing was ordered because of
Thompson's illicit conduct. Thompson challenged the lower court's find-
ing, contending that the exclusionary rule precluded the evidence from be-
ing introduced at a probation revocation hearing.5"
Judge Mack, writing for a unanimous court, examined Thompson's con-
tention in view of the nature and purpose of the exclusionary rule, of pro-
bation, and of probation revocation hearings. The court noted that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to remedy individual violations of
fourth amendment rights, but to deter law enforcement officials from con-
44. Id at 1209 n.5. Although a grand jury is also provided for in the code, see 18
U.S.C. § 3321 (1976), the Supreme Court in Calandra exempted it from the operation of the
exclusionary rule, thereby indicating that such a factor is not dispositive of the rule's appli-
cation. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
45. 585 F.2d at 1209. This contradicts dicta in both Gagnon and Greenholtz, wherein
the Supreme Court referred to the consequences of such a proceeding as the revocation of a
privilege, rather than as the imposition of a penalty. In both Gagnon and Greenholtz the
defendants were incarcerated, but later granted freedom based on certain conditions. See
generally Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Gagnon v. Scarpeli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
46. 585 F.2d at 1211. The Workman court cited the Supreme Court in Wong Sun for
the proposition that the exclusionary rule should apply in all criminal proccedings. It is not
clear whether the Wong Sun Court made such an absolute statement, see supra note 33. See
also Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), and supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
47. 444 A.2d 972 (D.C. 1982).
48. Id at 973. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Short v. United States,
366 A.2d 781 (D.C. 1976) held that a probation revocation hearing is administrative, not
criminal, in nature. Id at 785. In Short, the court held that immunity from prosecution did
not extend to probation revocation hearings. Id.
49. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3201 (1981) provides that carrying a weapon without a li-
cense is illegal.
50. 444 A.2d at 973.
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ducting unlawful searches and seizures.5' Moreover, Judge Mack stressed
that the exclusionary rule had been applied only in criminal proceedings,
5 2
and emphasized that a probation revocation hearing is an administrative,
rather than criminal, proceeding.53 Thus, the exclusionary rule's applica-
bility must be determined by balancing the competing interests of commu-
nity safety and rehabilitation, against the deterrent value of excluding the
evidence. 4 The Thompson court found that there were no egregious cir-
cumstances attending the violation of fourth amendment rights5 that
would tip the balance in favor of the deterrence interest. 6 Hence, the
Thompson court followed the trend of a majority of the jurisdictions that
have considered the issue, by appreciating the need for full and accurate
information in the probation revocation setting.57 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has not considered
this issue, and as a result, Thompson constitutes the only ruling on the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings in
the District of Columbia.
The Supreme Court in Harris, Calandra, Hass, and Janis limited the
exlusionary rule's applicability in criminal proceedings to the case-in-
chief.58 It is apparent that as long as the evidence was obtained for a dif-
ferent purpose, the societal interest in using the illegally obtained evidence
far outweighs the deterrent value.
The facts of Thompson clearly fall within this standard. Thompson's
weapons charge was dropped after the court granted a motion to suppress
the illegally seized evidence.59 The officers apparently did not know of
Thompson's probationary status, nor was there any evidence of a willful
attempt to revoke his probation.6" Thus, no deterrent interest was served
by excluding the seized evidence.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 973-74. See, e.g., Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
53. 444 A.2d at 974. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
54. Id (citing United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975)).
55. 444 A.2d at 975. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not disturb the
lower court's finding that no egregious circumstances were present.
56. Id. Judge Mack indicated that egregious circumstances would be "[where, for ex-
ample, illegal acts of a government agent were directed specifically at a probationer or
[where they] shock the conscience .... " In such a situation, she said, "the deterrent effect
that exclusion of such evidence would have, outweighed the need of the sentencing court for
full and reliable information." Id.
57. Id. at 974-75.
58. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
59. 444 A.2d at 973.
60. Id. at 975. The court did not disturb the lower court's findings. Id.
1983]
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Although the court intimated that the exclusionary rule would apply in
"egregious circumstances,"'" it is unclear precisely what circumstances
would be considered egregious. For example, a law enforcement officer
may be aware of a probationer's status and nevertheless act in good faith
while conducting an illegal search and seizure. It is not clear whether this
knowledge will automatically activate the exclusionary rule for purposes of
a probation revocation hearing.62 On the other hand, the probationer re-
quires protection from law enforcement officers who may proceed care-
lessly or with unusual malice due to their knowledge of the probationer's
status. Even if the seized evidence is inadmissible in the case-in-chief,
such ill-intentioned officers may well be satisfied with the revocation of
probation. Perhaps the probationer's interests are best protected by the
"egregious circumstances" standard enunciated by the Thompson court.
The failure of the court to set clear guidelines for determining what con-
stitutes egregious circumstances underscores the necessity of determining
the relevant facts on a case-by-case basis to protect the probationer's inter-
ests. The resulting individualized treatment may increase the rights of the
probationer because the court, while serving to safeguard the interests of
society, must attempt to assess the officer's knowledge of probationary
status.63
While consistent with the Supreme Court's application of the exclusion-
ary rule, Thompson further limits the rule's applicability. The unanimity
of the court reflects the strong support for social interests and the uncer-
tainty inherent in any application of the concept of deterrence. The ab-
sence of guidelines and a definition of egregious circumstances indicates
that future evaluation of these cases will be on an individual basis, thus
ensuring both the safeguards of the fourth amendment and the value of
deterrence.
Elaine Charlson Bredehoft
61. Id. at 974-75.
62. While the court considered police knowledge of the probationer's status relevant in
determining egregious circumstances, it also cited intentional seizure to cause revocation,
and acts which shock the conscience. Id at 975. See supra note 56.
63. Id. at 974.
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